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Book Reviews 
PLAYING WITHOUT A REFEREE: 
CONGRESS, THE PRESIDENT, AND 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
THE PRESIDENT'S AUTHORITY OVER FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS: AN ESSAY IN CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION. By H. Jefferson PoweW. Carolina 
Academic Press. 2002. Pp. ix, 165. $30.00. 
Daniel A. Farbe? 
Jeff Powell, one of our leading constitutional historians, has 
given us an elegant little book on a much debated question: the 
respective powers of Congress and the President over foreign af-
fairs. Much sound and fury has been produced by this constitu-
tional debate. Powell sensibly advises that we agree on a reason-
able solution and move on. He would prefer that our leaders 
address the merits of particular foreign policy issues rather than 
using constitutional law as a source of rhetorical bombs to be 
hurtled at each other. (p. xv) This is sound advice, and his solu-
tion has much to recommend it. But I doubt that his call will be 
heeded. Indeed, in the absence of an external referee, it seems 
unlikely that any solution could succeed in stilling the debate. To 
think otherwise is probably to misunderstand how constitutional 
arguments function in this context. 
If there were to be a constitutional settlement between 
Congress and the President, Powell's solution would have much 
to recommend it. On his reading of the Constitution, "the presi-
dent enjoys an extremely broad range of discretion in the mak-
I. Professor of Law, Duke University. 
2. Sho Sato Professor of Law, University of California at Berkeley, and McKnight 
Presidential Professor of Public Law, University of Minnesota. 
693 
694 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 19:693 
ing of foreign policy"-but equally importantly, Congress has 
"an array of means by which to react to presidential initiatives, 
favorable or not." (p. xv) Powell eschews what he views as the 
polarized and extremist positions often taken by the executive 
branch's lawyers and by scholars advocating congressional su-
premacy. (pp. 10-18) In his view, "the Constitution allocates au-
thority along sequential lines: exclusively legislative power to 
create and maintain most of the tools of foreign policy followed 
by independent and generally exclusive executive authority to 
formulate foreign policy and pursue it, followed by the legisla-
ture's capacity to review, criticize and, within limits, forbid." (p. 
140) 
Although Powell lays much stress on presidential preroga-
tives, he also makes fair allowance for congressional power. Un-
der Powell's reading of the Constitution, "Congress may freely 
enact whatever legislation it chooses, no matter how great its 
impact on foreign affairs," so long as it does "not require the 
president to engage in diplomacy ... in accordance with its pref-
erences." (p. 145) Within broad limits, it can use spending condi-
tions to influence presidential actions. (p. 143) Notably, Powell 
also thinks that the War Powers Resolution is constitutional. 
(pp. 122-125) Although the president can initiate the use of force 
under some circumstances, he must obtain congressional ap-
proval when the military action "rises to the constitutional level 
of 'war"' in terms of its scope, duration, and violence. (p. 122) 
There is much to be said for Powell's vision. It fits fairly well 
with current and historical practice. It's at least a plausible read-
ing of the historical record, though in my view it assumes an un-
realistic degree of clarity and consensus in the views of the 
Founding generation. It seems reasonable, giving the President 
plenty of power to manage foreign relations while supplying 
Congress with adequate checks. Overall, if there were some ex-
ternal referee like the Supreme Court that could lay down the 
law, Powell's constitutional formulation would be an attractive 
candidate. 
The trouble is not with this solution but with the idea that 
this dispute can be definitively settled. The only real point of 
common ground is the historical record, but the record simply 
isn't clear enough to dictate any one answer. Even if Powell is 
correct that there is in some sense a "right" legal answer about 
the exact boundaries between the branches, the answer is too 
contestable to overcome the considerable interests and biases 
that each side brings to the debate. Politically, constitutional 
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rhetoric is vital for the President and Congress as each struggles 
to rally supporters, motivating those who agree with their posi-
tions and providing rationales for resisting the opposing side. 
Powell observes that the constitutional rhetoric obscures the 
substantive issues, but from the point of view of the political ac-
tors, this may be an important part of its function. In any event, 
there is no mechanism for creating a binding agreement between 
the branches, and neither branch can afford to unilaterally dis-
arm its constitutional rhetoric. 
I do not mean to say that the constitutional issues are com-
pletely indeterminate. What the Constitution tells us is that some 
balance between presidential initiative and accountability is re-
quired, but it does not specify the balance with precision. His-
torical practice has clarified a number of issues. By now, each 
side is in comfortable possession of a certain amount of territory, 
whether because of constitutional text, original understanding, 
historical practice, or contemporary exigencies. But there is a 
large "no man's land" where neither side has an assured claim, 
and each side also makes occasional raids into the other's home 
territory. 
The first two sections of this review analyze Powell's claim 
that a clear legal solution exists. Part I considers the argument 
that the "vesting clause" in Article II provides the president with 
a clearly defined reservoir of "executive power," forming a basis 
for presidential control of foreign affairs. Powell repeatedly in-
vokes this argument, though it is not his main reliance. (pp. 44-
45, 74, 76, 93-94) I doubt, however, that any such clear general 
understanding of executive power was entertained by the indi-
viduals who ratified the Constitution. Undoubtedly, the Framers 
had some general conception of executive power, but it was 
probably as cloudy and disputed as our contemporary ideas on 
the subject. 
Part II then considers Powell's argument that later practice 
provides clear answers to these questions. Here, I think he is 
right in part, but I believe that some critical aspects of later prac-
tice are too ambiguous or contested to form a reliable guide. He 
relies almost entirely on the practice of early administrations, 
which (not surprisingly) favored executive power. But whether 
these practices were widely accepted as legitimate is unclear. 
Powell attempts to bolster the authority of the early executive 
claims by relying on the stature of the men who made them and 
on the basic plausibility of their claims. Here again, I think he 
makes a reasonable case but overstates its persuasive force. 
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Finally, Part III considers Powell's goal of lessening the role 
of constitutional rhetoric in the struggle between the branches. 
Powell complains that the "chief problem with current practice, 
and it is a serious one, is the focus on legal disputation that fol-
lows like clockwork from the radically opposed constitutional 
viewpoints at play in foreign-policy discussion." (p. xv) But we 
should not expect to see Powell's hoped-for switch to a less 
bombastic, more substantive discourse about foreign affairs. In 
the absence of an external referee who could provide a disinter-
ested judgment, constitutional argument is not necessarily de-
signed to persuade an objective observer. Rather, it will often 
be used to appeal to the loyalties of wavering elements within 
Congress or within the executive branch itself, allowing the 
President and the congressional leadership to garner support 
from individuals who may be unwilling or unable to endorse 
their view of the merits of the dispute. 
As both lawyers and scholars, we have a natural tendency to 
think of constitutional disputes as addressed to some objective 
observer. But a better analogy here would be to labor-
management disputes, in which both sides use various economic 
and rhetorical weapons to sway the outcome. As in labor-
management disputes, some issues are not seriously contested, 
and the past interactions of the parties count for a great deal. 
Both sides have an incentive to reach a deal, but not at the ex-
pense of their own interests. Foreign relations law, then, can be 
considered the outcome of two centuries of strife and bargaining 
between the two branches. Collective bargaining agreements 
may be a better analog than judicial opinions, if we are seeking 
to understand how this form of law comes into existence. 
I. THE ENIGMATIC GRANT OF 
EXECUTIVE POWER 
Powell rests part of his case on the general grant of the "ex-
ecutive power" to the president. In analyzing presidential power, 
we should begin, at least, with the text. Article II opens with the 
statement: "The executive Power shall be vested in a President 
of the United States of America." After this "vesting" clause, 
almost half of Article II is dedicated to describing the election 
procedure, the qualifications for office, the president's salary ar-
rangements, and similar matters. The first section of Article II 
then closes with the oath clause, requiring the president to swear 
that he will "faithfully execute the Office of President of the 
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United States, and will to the best of my Ability, preserve, pro-
tect and defend the constitution of the United States." The next 
two sections are about half as long, combined, as section 1. They 
set out some specific presidential powers. For present purposes, 
two sets of powers are crucial. First, the president is "Com-
mander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and 
of the Militia of the several states, when called into the actual 
Service of the United States." Second, he is empowered to re-
ceive foreign ambassadors and to appoint U.S. ambassadors 
(with the consent of the Senate). Third, he can make treaties, 
also with the consent of the Senate. Article II also contains a 
hodgepodge of less relevant powers of varying degrees of signifi-
cance-to issue pardons, to give the State of the Union Address, 
and to demand the opinions of cabinet officers in writing. Article 
II ends on a harsher tone in a section establishing the procedures 
for impeaching the president and all other civil officers.3 
On its face, the text of Article II does not convey any clear 
impression about the stature of the office. On the one hand, the 
office is vested with "the executive power," which sounds 
weighty, not to mention the power to command the armed 
forces. (The Framers had never heard of Mao, but surely they 
would not have been unfamiliar with the Hobbesian notion that 
all power grows out of the barrel of a gun.) On the other hand, 
one might question whether the president was such a momen-
tous figure after all, since the drafters thought it necessary to in-
clude express sanction even for the president to get written opin-
ions from the cabinet or to recommend legislation to Congress.4 
The Framers might have devoted more care to explaining 
the powers of the office if they had not had to devote so much 
time to more basic questions about its structure. The Virginia 
Plan, which provided the basic framework for discussion at the 
Convention, called for a national executive but left unspecified 
the term of office or even the number of individuals who would 
compose the executive. The delegates then spent most of the 
summer going around in circles, as they debated whether the 
president would be elected by Congress or otherwise, whether 
there would be one chief executive or several, and other attrib-
utes of the office. As of the end of July, they had decided on 
congressional election and ineligibility for reelection, and they 
3. A useful collection of materials bearing on presidential power can be found in 
Peter M. Shane and Harold H. Bruff, Separation of Powers Law: Cases and Material 
(Carolina Academic Press, 1996). 
4. U.S. Const., art. 2, sec. 2, '11. 
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had assigned the president almost all the powers that would ul-
timately be found in Article II, except the treaty and appoint-
ments powers. In late August, when they took up the subject 
again, the confusion continued. On August 31, they gave up and 
referred the matter to a special Committee of Eleven, which re-
ported back on September 4 with the essentials of the current 
Article 11.5 
One source of the difficulty was the lack of good models. 
The colonial governors had been widely reviled. In reaction, 
post-Revolutionary state constitutions sharply limited the execu-
tive power. Most state executives were chosen by the legislature; 
only New York originally provided for a popularly elected ex-
ecutive. Terms of office were as short as one year, and governors 
shared their authority in many states with a council. Executives 
were given few specific powers, and often even these were sub-
ject to legislative interference or oversight. Just to be on the safe 
side, Virginia warned its governor "not, under any pretence, [to] 
exercise any power or prerogative, by virtue of any law, statute 
or custom of England. "6 In contrast, New York's popularly 
elected governor had a three-year term, and turned out to be a 
more powerful figure. The state constitution directed him "to 
transact all necessary business with the officers of government, 
civil and military; to take care that the laws are faithfully exe-
cuted, to the best of his ability; and to expedite all such measures 
as may be resolved upon by the legislature."7 He was also com-
mander in chief of the militia. The later state constitutions, like 
Massachusetts in 1780 and New Hampshire in 1784, moved 
somewhat in the direction of the New York model. As Madison 
said, the boundaries of executive, legislative and judicial power, 
though clear in theory, "consist in many instances of mere 
shades of difference. "8 Little wonder that, as one historian re-
cently put it, "[w]hat strikes anyone who examines the era in any 
depth, especially those historians who have devoted years to the 
exercise, is its complexity, contradictions, and, at times, confu-
sion."9 
At least to some extent, Powell seems to agree with this 
view of the framing and ratification periods. He indicates that 
5. See Daniel A. Farber and Suzanna Sherry, A History of the American Constitu· 
cion 81-98 (West, 1990). 
6. ld. at 79-81. 
7. Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 Yale L.J. 1725, 1771 
(1996). 
8. I d. at 1807. 
9. Id. at 1775. 
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the "ambiguity about the location of authority over foreign poli-
cymaking apparent on the face of the Constitution's text is repli-
cated in the materials traditionally viewed as evidence of the 
original understanding of the Constitution's meaning." (p. 30) 
He also notes that "the presidential office took shape only later 
in the deliberations of the Philadelphia framers, and it is difficult 
to identify unifying themes from their discussion about the in-
tended role of the president beyond what one can derive from 
the spare text which they drafted." (p. 30) Furthermore, the 
"ratification period did not produce much greater clarity." (p. 
30) Thus, the original understanding seems notably unclear. But 
the obscurity of the record has not impeded vigorous scholarly 
advocacy. 
Recent scholars have scrutinized the relatively sparse lan-
guage of Article II with almost microscopic care. One key ques-
tion has been the significance of the vesting clause. Is this clause 
merely prefatory, or is it an independent source of presidential 
authority-and if so, of how much? 
Advocates of broad presidential power-currently called 
the "unitary executive" theory-argue that the vesting clause is 
the key to Article II. Like the similar clause "vesting" the judi-
cial power in the federal courts, they argue, it infuses the rele-
vant individuals with general powers- in contrast to the clause 
in Article I that merely vests Congress with "[a]ll legislative 
Powers herein granted," leaving the actual granting of the pow-
ers until later sections. With so much emphasis placed on the in-
troductory vesting clause, the question obviously arises of what 
to make of the rest of Article II. If the president's primary 
source of power is the vesting clause, what function is left for 
sections 2 and 3? Advocates of the unitary executive have not 
hesitated to provide an answer. In their view, to the extent sec-
tions 2 and 3 are not merely redundant reminders of some spe-
cific executive powers, their more specific grants of powers 
merely "help to limit and give content to the otherwise poten-
tially vast grant of power that the vesting Clause of Article II 
confers on the President." In large part, according to advocates 
of the "unitary" executive, what appear to be grants of power 
are actually limitations-the treaty clause, for example, limits 
the president's power to make treaties by requiring him to get 
Senate approval. In short, enthusiastic advocates of this theory 
conclude, "the textual case" for their theory "is as free of ambi-
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guity as the textual case that the President must be at least 
thirty-five years old."10 
This argument has not gone unchallenged. Critics argue that 
there was no well-understood bundle of executive powers that 
could simply be conveyed by the clause, and that the subtle dif-
ferences of phrasing between the vesting clauses for the various 
branches simply escaped any notice at the time. What the term 
"executive power" actually meant was unclear. Perhaps the 
Framers were more concerned about insuring a proper balance 
of power between the branches than in delineating the exact 
boundaries of their authority. What the evidence does not allow, 
says one critic, "is an assertion that the cryptic phrase 'executive 
power' refers to a clear, eighteenth-century baseline that just 
happens to dovetail with the modern formalist conception of 
that same term." 11 
Other critics of the unitary executive theory point to other 
subtle differences in language that might undermine that the-
ory.12 The Appointments Clause allows certain officers to be se-
lected by the "heads of departments," while the Opinions Clause 
speaks of the "principal Officer" of "each of the executive De-
partments". Does this suggest that some "departments" have 
heads, but are not "executive Departments" with "principal Of-
ficers"? If so, perhaps the government has officers who are not 
"executive" and therefore not part of the "executive power" or 
subject to presidential control. In turn, advocates of the unitary 
executive argue that this difference in terminology (unlike the 
different phrasing of the vesting clauses) is entirely "meaning-
less." 13 
These efforts to hypothesize some indisputable meaning for 
Article II seem to miss the point. The main argument for reli-
ance on the original understanding is based on the concept of 
popular consent: We the People gave life to the Constitution 
through ratification, and therefore its meaning must correspond 
to the understanding of a reasonable person of the time. Without 
pausing to debate whether this is actually a decisive argument 
10. Steven G. Calabresi and Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power to Exe-
cute the Laws, 104 Yale L.J. 541,559 (1994). 
II. Flaherty, 105 Yale L.J. at 1792 (cited in note 7). 
12. See Lawrence Lessig and Cass Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 
94 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1994) (distinguishing between executive departments and other 
administrators). 
13. See Calabresi and Prakash, 104 Yale L.J. at 629 (cited in note 10). But see A. 
Michael Froomkin, Still Naked After All These Words, 88 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1420 (1994) (cri-
tiquing Calabresi's views). 
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for some form of originalism, we must observe that there is a 
limit to the amount of weight that can be placed on the idea of 
the reasonable reader. Is the reasonable reader supposed to be 
someone with microscopic powers of linguistic analysis, a com-
plete knowledge of English and American legal history, an inti-
mate knowledge of the works of Locke and Montaigne, and an 
unlimited time to ponder the logical implications of subtle struc-
tural features? If so, perhaps this so-called reasonable reader 
would have finally settled on the unitarian interpretation (or on 
its opposite). But such a "reasonable reader" never existed and 
had no connection with the limited human abilities of the people 
who in fact had to vote on the Constitution. 
Nor is there any reason to think that the average ratifier had 
a coherent theory uniting the general grant of executive power, 
the specific grants of presidential power, and the overlapping 
grants of legislative power over military and foreign affairs. If 
generations of later scholars have not been able to agree, why 
assume that the gentleman farmers, businessmen, and local poli-
ticians at the ratification conventions would have been magically 
able to discern the one true answer? 
If the legitimacy of the Constitution rests on the consent of 
real human beings rather than imagined ideal interpreters, its 
meaning ought to be tied to what they had some reasonable 
chance of understanding, not to the deductions of some entirely 
hypothetical reader with unlimited expertise, time, and intelli-
gence. And if we ask what an actual intelligent Eighteenth Cen-
tury reader, who made a reasonable effort to understand the 
text, would have understood about Article II, the answer can 
only be that such a reader would have been unsure about the ex-
act parameters of executive authority. To bind such a ratifier to 
esoteric deductions made long after the fact would make the 
Constitution an exercise in bait-and-switch, not in the consent of 
the governed. 
As Justice Robert Jackson said in a famous opinion on 
presidential power, "Just what our forefathers did envision, or 
would have envisioned had they foreseen modern conditions, 
must be divined from materials almost as enigmatic as the 
dreams Joseph was called upon to interpret for Pharaoh." 14 He 
added that a "century and a half" -now over two centuries- "of 
partisan debate and scholarly speculation yields no net result but 
14. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring). 
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only supplies more or less apt ~uotations from respected sources 
on each side of any question."1 It is an exaggeration to say that 
the historical records teach us nothing, but they clearly fail to 
provide any precise guidance about the boundaries of presiden-
tial power. Thus, the most accurate originalist answer is that the 
original understanding of the text suffered from ambiguity. For 
the non-originalist, of course, there is even less reason to obsess 
over eighteenth century linguistics in an effort to decode Article 
II. 
This is not to say that presidential power was a complete ci-
pher. The specific grants of power to the president, as well as re-
lated grants of power to Congress in military and foreign affairs, 
give some guidance. The framers built on a history of disputes 
about executive power. We know that they considered the post-
revolutionary governors too weak. We also know that they con-
sidered the pre-revolutionary governors and the English mon-
arch too strong. Like Goldilocks, they wanted something that 
was "not too strong" and "not too weak" but "just right." They 
wanted as much executive energy and initiative as possible with-
out upsetting the proper balance of republican government. But 
these principles were too general to resolve hard cases. Thus, 
when particular questions about executive power arise, text and 
original understanding can provide only limited guidance. 16 
It is not merely speculation to say that reasonable readers 
would have found the meaning of the "executive power" to be 
unclear. We know that, in fact, quite a number of very intelli-
gent, careful readers did in fact find it unclear. No sooner was 
the Constitution ratified than the very men who had drafted and 
enacted it found themselves at odds over the scope of executive 
power. In a Congress full of members of the Constitutional Con-
vention and participants in the ratification debate, no consensus 
existed even on the basic question of whether the president had 
the power to fire his own subordinates. After considerable de-
bate, Madison seems to have persuaded a majority of his col-
leagues in the House that the President did have this power-
though the sequence of votes and coalitions makes this a little 
unclear. Half the Senators disagreed. Since Senate approval was 
required to appoint cabinet members, many Senators thought, it 
15. ld. at 634-35. 
16. On the conflicting values involved in assessing executive power, see Geoffrey P. 
Miller, The Unitary Executive in a Unified Theory of Constitutional Law: The Problem of 
Interpretation, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 201 (1993) (energy versus avoidance of faction); 
Flaherty, 105 Yale L.J. at 1802-804 (cited in note 7) (energy, accountability and balance). 
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should also be required for their removal. 17 And even Madison 
seems to have been confused about the issue: shortly thereafter, 
he argued that Con~ress did have some control over the tenure 
of certain officials. As a recent historian remarks, "leading 
framers thought about the executive in notably divergent ways," 
and it was "precisely because their views diverged so sharply that 
disagreements over the power of the presidency emerged as a 
potent source of constitutional controversy in the 1790s."19 
My view is not, of course, an original one. Edward Corwin, 
the great Twentieth Century expert on the presidency, con-
cluded that the Constitution's provisions on foreign power did 
not definitively divide authority, but instead were "an invitation 
to struggle for the privilege of directing American foreign pol-
icy." (p. 4) Far earlier, Madison had commented on the general 
difficulty of defining the separate powers of the three branches. 
In Federalist 37, he said that "[e]xperience has instructed us that 
no skill in the science of government has yet been able to dis-
criminate and define, with sufficient certainty, its three great 
provinces-the legislative, executive, and judiciary; or even the 
privileges and powers of the different legislative branches. "20 
Madison observed that questions arise on a daily basis "which 
prove the obscurity which reigns in these subjects, and which 
puzzle the greatest adepts in political science."21 (After all, he 
said, "[w]hen the Almighty himself condescends to address 
mankind in their own language, his meaning, luminous as it must 
be, is rendered dim and doubtful by the cloudy medium through 
which it is transmitted."22) He added that "[a)ll new laws, though 
penned with the greatest technical skill and passed on the fullest 
and most mature deliberation, are considered as more or less ob-
scure and equivocal, until their meaning be liquidated and ascer-
tained by a series of particular discussions and adjudications. "23 
To some extent, later practice has indeed succeeded in clari-
fying the scope of presidential authority over foreign affairs, but 
17. Forrest McDonald, The American Presidency: An Intellectual History, 219-220 
(U. Press of Kansas, 1994). 
18. Calabresi and Prakash, 104 Yale L.J. at 652 (cited in note 10). 
19. Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of the 
Constitution 245 (Knopf, 1996). 
20. Federalist 37 (Madison), in Isaac Kramnick, ed., The Federalist Papers 244-45 
(Penguin, 1987). 
21. ld. 
22. ld. 
23. ld. 
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not to the extent that Madison may have hoped or that Powell 
now contends.Z4 
II. LET US NOW PRAISE FAMOUS MEN 
Powell's view is that a "clear answer" to the question of for-
eign affairs power was "advanced in the first decade or so of the 
Constitution's practical interpretation by high officials of the 
government, including George Washington, James Madison, 
Thomas Jefferson, and Alexander Hamilton." (p. 27) "[T]o a 
remarkable extent," these major figures agreed "on the constitu-
tional locus of authority" over foreign affairs. (p. 36) Even Pow-
ell's own account of the key incidents, however, indicates that 
the views of Washington and other early presidents were poorly 
articulated or ill-accepted at the time. Three of the episodes that 
Powell addresses stand out. 
The first episode was the famous debate between Hamilton 
and Madison over Washington's neutrality proclamation. (pp. 
47-51) Even Powell concedes that this exchange is "on its face, 
the clearest example of important constitutional disagreement 
over the distribution of foreign affairs powers within the group 
of founders I am discussing." (p. 49) He argues, however, that 
they "actually disagreed on constitutional issues far less than is 
usually believed." (p. 49) But Powell makes a major concession: 
Even on Powell's view the "fracas" "suggests that issues involv-
ing war raise special constitutional concerns." (p. 51) But a 
framework on foreign affairs that settles everything except the 
power over war and peace has a gaping hole in it. 
The second episode was the affair of the Little Sarah. The 
Little Sarah had been captured by the French in May of 1794 and 
was refitted to sail under the French flag as the privateer Petite 
Democrate. (p. 56) Allowing the ship to sail could lead to an an-
gry British response for failure to observe the terms of neutral-
ity, while halting the ship by force could conceivably be consid-
ered an act of war against France. (p. 57) The cabinet seemed to 
be agreed that the President had the power to order the gover-
24. I agree with Powell on the relevance of later practice, in part for the reasons 
given by Madison. John Hart Ely argues that later practice cannot modify the War 
Clause in Article I because its meaning is unmistakable (a requirement of prior congres-
sional consent to war is required when feasible). John Hart Ely, War and Responsibility: 
Constitutional Lessons of Vietnam and Its Aftermath 10 (1993). Given this textual clarity, 
he argues, "[u]surpation isn't precedent, it's usurpation." Id. Whatever may be said of 
this argument in the specific context of war powers, the question of how much general 
authority the vesting clause gives the president is by no means so clear. 
2002] BOOK REVIEWS 705 
nor to halt the ship,25 but disagreed about the right course and 
on whether they had the power to give the order in his absence. 
(pp. 57-58) In any event, the governor of Pennsylvania appar-
ently ignored their request. (p. 58) Moreover, as Powell indi-
cates, the constitutional premises of the cabinet's actions "were 
largely implicit," though Powell claims they can be "teased out 
with some confidence." 26 (p. 59) 
In any event, the lesson which Powell draws from this and 
earlier incidents is that "Washington and his advisors clearly be-
lieved" in a broad presidential power over foreign affairs. But 
it's not surprising, after all, that presidents take a broad view of 
their own power; it would be much more impressive if we had 
evidence that Congress or the general public agreed. But the 
evidence of such consensus is weak. In one dispute with Con-
gress over the confidentiality of certain papers, for example, a 
majority of the House ultimately did demand the papers and as-
sert its right to withhold funds to implement the related treaty 
(p. 75); the fact that the House decided not to exercise this 
power "by a razor-thin majority" hardly proves acceptance of 
the executive's view of the constitutional issue.27 
A third episode is more promising in this respect. This epi-
sode involved a petty officer in the British navy, who had been 
accused of committing murder and who may or may not have 
been an American citizen. (p. 79) He was in federal custody, but 
a federal judge refused to allow him to be turned over to the 
British without the president's sanction. The case became some-
thing of a cause celebre, which the Jeffersonians used as an ex-
cuse to badger the reigning Federalists. (p. 81) John Marshall 
gave a brilliant speech defending the president's action28; 
whether the House concurred is left unclear from Powell's ac-
count. In any event, Marshall was defending a "client" who had 
25. David Currie raises some significant questions about whether this conclusion 
was correct. See David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The Federalist Period, 
1789-1801 at 174-80 (U. of Chicago Press, 1997). 
26. Given Powell's view that only Congress can legislate domestically, it is not clear 
to me that under his view, Washington had any right to order the use of force on Ameri-
can soil to prevent the ship from sailing. 
27. Currie argues that the House was right to insist on its discretion in whether to 
implement the treaty. See Currie, The Constitution in Congress at 211-17 (cited in note 
25). 
28. The most recent, comprehensive treatment of the episode speaks of the "ambi-
tious, even radical, character of John Marshall's claim for the Presidency." Ruth Wedg-
wood, The Revolutionary Manyrdom of Jonathan Robbins, 100 Yale L.J. 229, 234-35 
(1990). She characterizes Adams himself as "surprisingly delicate concerning the Execu-
tive's relation to a judge." Id. at 290. Notably, Jefferson was unpersuaded by Marshall's 
argument. See id. at 354. 
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asserted something less than plenary presidential power over 
everything touching foreign relations. President Adams himself, 
in the action that was the subject of the controversy, had ex-
pressed doubt about his authority to direct the judge to turn the 
prisoner over to the British and had only been willing to offer 
the judge his "advice and request" to that effect. (p. 80) Marshall 
may have taken a more aggressive view of presidential powers in 
debate (p. 85), but surely his defense cannot count for more than 
the view of the president himself on the matter.29 
On Powell's version of the facts, what all of this proves is 
that early Presidents and their supporters were keen advocates 
of presidential authority in foreign affairs. Why should this mat-
ter? Here, Powell offers two answers. The first is that Washing-
ton, Jefferson and company were great men, whose constitu-
tional views are entitled to great respect. (p. 36) I have no 
quarrel with this general principle, but we may want to apply it 
with a grain of salt in this context. All of these great men were 
connected with the executive and had a strong motive for pro-
moting a broad view of presidential power. Moreover, one of the 
reasons that they are so well remembered today is simply that 
they were connected with the executive. (Marshall is of course 
much more famous as Chief Justice than as Secretary of State or 
a Member of Congress, but if he had not been such a staunch 
supporter of Adams it seems unlikely that he would have re-
ceived the last-minute judicial appointment.) It is very difficult 
for a member of Congress to enjoy lasting historical fame, re-
gardless of ability or historical significance. Notably, the few ex-
ceptions that come to mind such as Clay, Calhoun, and Webster, 
also served in prominent executive positions and had serious 
presidential aspirations. So a decision to privilege the views of 
the famous is in effect almost inevitably biased in favor of the 
executive's views as opposed to those of Congress. 
Powell's other reason for favoring the views of these men is 
that he thinks they were right. As he explains, "Washington and 
29. In addition, by Powell's description, Marshall's defense sounds suspiciously 
overbroad. According to Powell, Marshall's view was that in extradition and prize cases, 
the President was the "only branch of the government responsible and empowered to act 
in such a case." (p. 87) But prize courts obviously did have the power to decide cases, and 
while they may have been guided by the "principles" established by the executive (p. 85 
n. 94}, the judicial decisions would have been nothing more than advisory opinions if it 
were true that only the executive has the power to act in matters affecting foreign affairs. 
Indeed, such an exclusive presidential prerogative would also seem to fly in the face of 
Article I, sec. 8, cl.ll, which gives Congress the power "to make Rules concerning Cap-
ture on Land and Water." 
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his associates grounded their reading of the Constitution of for-
eign affairs in the Republic's fundamental need for an effective 
system of making and implementing foreign policy and in the in-
stitutional relationships which they thought must govern be-
tween the branches." (p. 94) Entrusted with some key specific 
powers over foreign affairs, "the president must equally be en-
trusted by the Constitution with responsibility for the substance 
of American foreign policy if we are to have the 'efficient na-
tional' government responsible for foreign affairs by 'uniform 
principles of policy' which Publius promised us [in the Federalist 
papers.]" (p. 94) Powell goes on to argue that as a practical mat-
ter, the president should have the power of initiative and control 
over foreign affairs. (pp. 105-106) There is nothing wrong with 
these arguments, but they are unlikely to persuade those who 
are less focused on efficiency and more worried about the need 
to avoid tyranny by limiting unchecked presidential authority. 
III. FOREIGN AFFAIRS LAW AS A FORM 
OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
One of Powell's key points is that the Constitution "gener-
ally provides for political rather than legal decisionmaking in the 
domain of foreign affairs." (p. 6) Whatever may be said of this as 
a normative matter, there is no question that it is true as a de-
scriptive matter. Powell would like to free those political dis-
putes from constitutional rhetoric. He would like to eliminate 
"constitutional quibbles over the power of congressional doves 
to veto executive hawkishness, even as it dismisses similar quib-
bles over the president's power to pursue those policies (hawkish 
or dovish) that he or she believes in the interest of the republic." 
(p. 150) In this vision, Congress and the president are both free 
to use their own armaments in their struggle with each other, 
with victory ultimately determining on the balance of political 
power. 
This vision is something like the traditional picture of un-
ion-management relationships in American law, which the Court 
has pictured as a contest with few holds barred. The Court has 
been vigilant to prevent state interference with conduct that 
Congress intended "to be controlled by the free play of eco-
nomic forces. "30 Although the Court has often addressed the is-
sue in the context of union activities, "self-help is of course also 
30. Lodge 76 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132,140 (1976) 
(quoting NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138, 144 (1971)). 
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the prerogative of the employer because he, too, may proper;r 
employ economic weapons Congress meant to be unregulable." 1 
The Court's view of labor relations is not unlike Powell's 
view of foreign relations. Except for a few activities prohibited 
by statute, the Court's position is that the labor-management 
struggle was deliberately left unregulated: 
Our decisions hold that Congress meant that these activities, 
whether of employer or of employees, were not to be regu-
lable by States any more than by the NLRB, for neither States 
nor the Board is "afforded flexibility in picking and choosing 
which economic devices of labor and management shall be 
branded as unlawful." Rather, both are without authority to 
attempt to "introduce some standard of properly 'balanced' 
bargaining power," or to define "what economic sanctions 
might be permitted negotiating parties in an 'ideal' or 'bal-
anced' state of collective bargaining." To sanction state regu-
lation of such economic pressure deemed by the federal Act 
"desirabl(y] ... left for the free play of contending economic 
forces, ... is not merely (to fill] a gap (by] outlaw(ing] what 
federal law fails to outlaw; it is denying one party to an eco-
nomic contest a weapon that Congress meant him to have 
available. "32 
Under this view, the heart of labor-management relations is con-
flict rather than consensus: 
[C]ollective bargaining ... cannot be equated with an aca-
demic collective search for truth-or even with what might be 
thought to be the ideal of one. The parties-even granting the 
modification of views that may come from a realization of 
economic interdependence-still proceed from contrary and 
to an extent antagonistic viewpoints and concepts of self-
interest. ... The presence of economic weapons in reserve, 
and their actual exercise on occasion by the parties, is part 
33 
and parcel of the system .... 
Of course, not every dispute results in a strike or lockout, and 
relations between employers and unions may be cordial and co-
operative. But when push comes to shove, the legal regime 
leaves it to the parties to mobilize their economic weapons and 
do battle.34 
31. Id.at147. 
32. Id. at 149-150 (citations omitted). 
33. NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Inti. Union, 361 U.S. 477,488-89 (1960). 
34. For further discussion of the preemption issues, see Douglas E. Ray, Calvin W. 
Sharpe, and Robert N. Strassfeld, Understanding Labor Law 372-79 (M. Bender, 1999). 
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The analogy between labor law and foreign affairs law is 
based on some important structural similarities. On one side of 
each dispute is a hierarchical bureaucracy- the executive branch 
in foreign affairs and management in labor law. On the other 
side is a group governed by majority rule, and prone to internal 
division and faction-Congress in one case, the union in the 
other. The two sides have some important overlapping interests. 
In the labor setting, neither wants the company to fail or to face 
a prolonged strike, while in foreign affairs, neither wishes to sac-
rifice national security or tie up vital government activities. 
Management, like the executive, has a sphere of unilateral ac-
tion. For example, it can close an operation without prior consul-
tation with the union, because of management's need for speed, 
flexibility, and secrecy in critical business matters.35 These rea-
sons are remarkably similar to the conventional justifications for 
presidential autonomy in foreign affairs. On the other hand, in 
both instances, the other side has economic weapons of consid-
erable force: workers can strike; Congress can withhold funding. 
In short, the resemblance is more than skin deep. 
This comparison sheds some light on Powell's aspiration for 
a more substantive deliberative process, free from bombastic 
claims of illegitimacy. Labor relations are notorious for rhetori-
cal overkill, a fact of which the Supreme Court has taken official 
notice. For example, in Linn v. United Plan Guard Workers of 
America, Loca/114,36 a leaflet falsely accused a supervisor of en-
gaging in criminal misconduct in depriving a some workers of 
their right to vote in three NLRB elections, robbing them of pay 
increases, and lying to employees.37 The Court stressed that la-
bor disputes are "ordinarily heated affairs" and that disputes 
over union representation "are frequently characterized by bit-
ter and extreme charges, countercharges, unfounded rumors, vi-
tuperations, personal accusations, misrepresentations, and dis-
tortions. "38 Both sides, the Court observed, "often speak bluntly 
and recklessly, embellishing their respective positions with im-
precatory language."39 Short of deliberately circulating factual 
information known to be false, the parties are entitled to use "in-
temperate, abusive, and inaccurate statements. "4° For similar 
reasons, in a later case the Court protected a union publication 
35. See First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666,682-83 (1981). 
36. 383 U.S. 53 (1966). 
37. Id. at 56-57. 
38. Id. at 58. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. at 61. 
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that characterized a named non-member as a scab, which the 
publication helpfully defined as a "two-legged animal with a 
corkscrew soul, a water brain, a combination backbone of jelly 
and glue. Where others have hearts, he carries a tumor of rotten 
principles." A scab like that nonmember, the publication con-
cluded, "is a traitor to his God, his country, his family and his 
class. "41 
Such extreme language, replete with charges of illegality 
and illegitimacy, is not surprising in the labor context. The union 
faces difficult collective action problems, with the need to forge 
a diverse group of employees into an effective united front under 
trying conditions. Correspondingly, management wants to un-
dermine union support by marginal members. Much the same is 
true in foreign affairs. Congressional opponents seek to present 
a united front against the President, who in tum tries to lure 
marginal opponents over to his side. To a lesser extent, congres-
sional opponents may be able to play the same game against the 
president, undermining his support in the bureaucracy and at the 
fringes of his political coalition. Individuals who may be unwill-
ing to take a strong public stand about the merits of the presi-
dent's policy may be moved by attacks on its legitimacy, while 
the president attempts to defend the legitimacy of his actions 
and delegitimize those of Congress. The rhetoric inevitably be-
comes heated as each side strives to hold its own supporters in 
line while causing defections on the other side. 
Thus, Powell may well be right to think that disputes over 
foreign affairs are at heart political rather than legal. But for this 
very reason, like labor and management, Congress and the 
president must use every rhetorical weapon in their battle. 
Claims of constitutional illegitimacy are an important part of 
their arsenal which neither side is likely to relinquish. For that 
reason, Powell's aspiration to eliminate constitutional debate 
from foreign policy disputes is probably doomed to failure. 
As I said at the beginning of this review, Powell's efforts to 
resolve the constitutional issues have much to recommend them. 
It might be nice to live in a world in which Congress and the 
president explicitly agreed to play by the same rules, a world 
where measured discussion of substance replaced impassioned 
charges of illegitimacy. But given the nature of the political 
process, and particularly the need for Congress to overcome its 
41. Old Dominion Branch No. 496 v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264,268 (1974). The language 
was drawn from a pamphlet by Jack London. 
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collective action problem in order to play any effective role at 
all, such a farewell to arms seems unlikely. And even if the par-
ties were reasonably open-minded about the legal merits, I think 
that Powell overestimates the degree of clarity they would find. 
There may be a right answer in some theoretical sense, but there 
is also plenty of room for reasonable disagreement. 
Neither the dynamics of the situation nor the merits are 
likely to push the parties to consensus on the legal issues. Thus, 
after two centuries of seemingly incessant bickering over the 
constitutional rules of the game, we are likely to face such dis-
putes for the indefinite future. With no impartial referee to de-
cide their dispute, the players are likely to respond to opposing 
arguments mainly by shouting louder and using nastier language. 
Let the games begin. 
